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Abstract. Microaggregation is one of the most commonly employed
microdata protection methods. The basic idea of microaggregation is
to anonymize data by aggregating original records into small groups of
at least k elements and, therefore, preserving k-anonymity. Usually, in
order to avoid information loss, when records are large, i.e., the number of
attributes of the data set is large, this data set is split into smaller blocks
of attributes and microaggregation is applied to each block, successively
and independently. This is called multivariate microaggregation. By using
this technique, the information loss after collapsing several values to
the centroid of their group is reduced. Unfortunately, with multivariate
microaggregation, the k-anonymity property is lost when at least two
attributes of different blocks are known by the intruder, which might be
the usual case.
In this work, we present a new microaggregation method called one di-
mension microaggregation (Mic1D− k). With Mic1D− k, the problem
of k-anonymity loss is mitigated by mixing all the values in the original
microdata file into a single non-attributed data set using a set of simple
pre-processing steps and then, microaggregating all the mixed values to-
gether. Our experiments show that, using real data, our proposal obtains
lower disclosure risk than previous approaches whereas the information
loss is preserved.
Keywords: Microaggregation, k-anonymity, Privacy in Statistical Databases
1 Introduction
Managing confidential data is a common practice in any organization. In many
cases, these data contain valuable statistical information required by third par-
ties for data analysis and, thus, privacy becomes essential, making it necessary
to release data sets preserving the statistics without revealing confidential infor-
mation. This is a typical problem, for instance, in statistics institutes.
One of the most popular approaches to achieve such a privacy level is to apply
perturbative protection methods on the microdata source file to be protected. This
approach consists in distorting the original data file so that the resulting data,
which is publicly released, does not permit the disclosure of sensitive information.
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A large number of protection methods exist (see e.g. [1], [6] and [28]). Apart
from protecting the privacy of the confidential information, perturbative data
protection methods must preserve the statistical utility of the original data as far
as possible. In this situation, the main challenge is to find the trade-off between
privacy and statistical utility.
Recently, microaggregation has emerged as one of the most promising pertur-
bative data protection methods. For example, [9] shows that microaggregation
is used by many statistical agencies for data anonymization. The basic imple-
mentation of microaggregation works as follows [6, 7, 23]: given a data set with
natt attributes, small clusters of at least k elements (records) are built and each
original record is replaced with the centroid of the cluster to which the record be-
longs to. A certain level of privacy is ensured because k records have an identical
protected value (k-anonymity [22, 25, 26]).
However, when natt is large, the statistical utility of the basic microaggre-
gation technique is diminished, specially if the attributes are not highly corre-
lated [2]. This is so because the larger the number of attributes, the larger the
distance between the original records in the data set and their corresponding
centroids. Therefore, a lot of information on the original data is lost when the
protected microdata file is released. To solve this drawback, the following nat-
ural strategy is applied by statistical agencies: the microdata file is split into
smaller blocks of attributes, and microaggregation is independently applied to
each block. This way, the information loss decreases, at the cost of decreasing
the achieved level of privacy since the property of k-anonymity is not ensured, as
we see later on in this paper. This kind of microaggregation methods are known
as multivariate microaggregation methods. Another important drawback of this
type of methods is that finding the optimal multivariate microaggregation (i.e.,
finding the clusters that minimize the sum of square errors) is NP-hard [20].
In this work, we propose to combine a set of preprocessing steps along with
microaggregation in order to minimize the disclosure risk without losing infor-
mation. We test this new method using real data showing that Mic1D−k is able
to outperform previous multivariate microaggregation methods diminishing the
risk of disclosure without increasing the information loss. Specifically, we com-
pare our new method with some of the most commonly used microaggregation
methods, showing that Mic1D − k achieves lower disclosure risk than previous
algorithms when different groups of attributes are known by an intruder.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic con-
cepts related to protection methods, focusing on microaggregation techniques.
In Section 3, we present our new microaggregation method called One dimension
microaggregation. Section 4 is devoted to compare traditional microaggregation
algorithms and our new microaggregation method using real data; we present our
experiments and the obtained results. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions
and presents some future work.
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2 Preliminaries on Protection Methods
In this section we present some basic concepts that will be useful for the un-
derstanding of the work presented in this paper. Namely, we first describe the
scenario where a microdata protection method is applied to preserve the privacy
of the owners of some statistical data. Then, we explain in detail several mi-
croaggregation techniques. Finally, we describe the most usual ways to measure
the quality of microaggregation methods, according to the levels of privacy and
statistical utility that they provide.
2.1 Statistical Data Protection
Let a microdata file X be a matrix with n rows (records) and natt columns (at-
tributes), where each row contains natt attributes of an individual. The attributes
in a microdata file can be classified into two different categories, identifiers or
quasi-identifiers, depending on their capability to identify unique individuals.
Identifier attributes are used to identify the individual unambiguously. The ma-
trix containing all the values related to these attributes will be denoted in this
paper by Id. A typical example of identifier is the passport number. A quasi-
identifier attribute is an attribute that is not able to identify a single individual
when it is used alone. However, when it is combined with other quasi-identifier
attributes, they can uniquely identify an individual. Among the quasi-identifier
attributes, we distinguish between confidential (Xc) and non-confidential (Xnc),
depending on the kind of information they contain. Therefore, we define a mi-
crodata file as X = (Id,Xnc, Xc). A first naive approach would be to eliminate
the identifier attributes and release (Xnc, Xc) in order to avoid the linkage of
confidential data (Xc) to real individuals. In this scenario, an intruder would be
able to re-identify individuals by obtaining the non-confidential quasi-identifier
attributes together with identifiers from other data sources and, therefore, dis-
closing confidential information.
In order to preserve statistical disclosure control, we use assume the solu-
tion proposed in [6] to compare several protection methods. This solution is
graphically depicted in Figure 1 and it works as follows:
(i) Identifier attributes in X are either removed or encrypted.
(ii) Confidential quasi-identifier attributes Xc are not modified; in this way, the
statistical utility of the confidential attributes is completely preserved.
(iii) A microdata protection method ρ is applied to non-confidential quasi-identifier
attributes, in order to preserve the privacy of the individuals whose confi-
dential data is being released, X ′nc = ρ(Xnc).
(iv) The released microdata file is X ′ = (ρ(Xnc), Xc).
In this scenario, as shown in Figure 2, an intruder might try to re-identify
individuals by obtaining the non-confidential quasi-identifier data (Xnc) together
with identifiers (Id) from other data sources. By applying record linkage between
the protected attributes (X ′nc) and the same attributes obtained from other
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Fig. 1. Data protection and release process.
data sources (Xnc), the intruder might be able to re-identify a percentage of the
protected individuals together with their confidential data (Xc). The quality of
a protection methods depends on the percentage of information that it allows to
re-identify, among other aspects.
2.2 Microaggregation
As introduced before, microaggregation ensures k-anonymity by building small
clusters of at least k elements and replacing the original values by the centroid
of the cluster to which the record belongs to.
There are other ways to achieve k-anonymity. For instance, in [3] authors
present a clustering technique where the released microdata file preserves k-
anonymity, as in basic microaggregation. In other solutions, such as those pre-
sented in [10], the data holder chooses different subsets of attributes ensuring
k-anonymity for each of these subsets independently, similarly to multivariate
microaggregation.
We have seen that, in order to solve the information loss problem of the basic
microaggregation method, multivariate microaggregation is used at the cost of
increasing the disclosure risk. Specifically, after dividing attributes into different
blocks and applying the basic microaggregation technique to each block sepa-
rately, the k records which fall in the same cluster for the first block of attributes,
may fall in a different cluster for any of the other blocks of attributes. So, the
resulting protected records will not be equal and no k-anonymity is ensured.
The easiest case for microaggregation in terms of attribute blocking complexity
occurs when the size of the attribute blocks is equal to one. In other words,
when each attribute is protected independently. This corresponds to Univariate
Microaggregation or Individual Ranking Microaggregation.
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Fig. 2. Disclosure Risk Scenario.
In order to preserve information loss as low as possible, microaggregation
methods try to minimize the total sum of distances between all the elements to
be protected and the centroid of the cluster where an element belongs to, i.e
minimize the total Sum of Square Errors (SSE):
SSE =
c∑
i=1
∑
xij∈Ci
(xij − x¯i)T (xij − x¯i),
where c is the total number of clusters, Ci is the i-th cluster and x¯i is the
centroid of Ci. The restriction is |Ci| ≥ k, for all i = 1, . . . , c. In general, the
larger value of k the lower the disclosure risk. Therefore, in order to parametrize
microaggregation methods, k has to be as large as possible without compromising
the statistical utility of the protected information.
The rational of this process is to make the protected data as similar as pos-
sible to the original one. In any case, methods should provide clusters with at
least k elements. As introduced before, finding the optimal multivariate microag-
gregation has been proven to be an NP-Hard problem. For this reason, heuristic
methods have been proposed in the literature.
For our work, we will use some of these different algorithms proposed for mi-
croaggregation in order to compare them to our new microaggregation technique.
In this section, we explain a deterministic and optimal algorithm for univariate
microaggregation, which is also used by two other methods for projection based
multivariate microaggregation: PCP microaggregation and Zscores microaggre-
gation. Finally, we describe one of the most used methods for heuristic microag-
gregation (specially for the multivariate case, although it can be applied to the
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univariate case as well): the MDAV (Maximum Distance to Average Vector)
algorithm.
Optimal Univariate Microaggregation Although multivariate microaggre-
gation has been proven to be a very complex problem, several polynomial ap-
proaches for the optimal univariate microaggregation as [11] may be found in the
literature. In [7], the authors present two relevant conclusions for the optimal
univariate microaggregation:
1. When elements are sorted according to an attribute, for any optimal parti-
tion, elements in each cluster are contiguous (non overlapping clusters exist)
2. All the clusters of any optimal partition contain between k and 2k − 1 ele-
ments.
Based on these two results, in [11] authors define an optimal univariate mi-
croaggregation as follows. Let A = (v1 . . . vn) be a vector of size n containing all
the values for the attribute being protected. The values are sorted in ascending
order so that if i < j then vi ≤ vj , where v1 is the smallest element and vn is
the largest element in A. Let k be an integer such that 1 ≤ k < n (k is directly
obtained from the microaggregation configuration).
Given A and k, a graph Gk,n is defined as follows. Firstly, we define the
nodes of G as the elements vi in A plus one additional node g0 (this node is
later needed to apply the Dijkstra algorithm). Then, for each node gi, we add to
the graph the directed edges (gi, gj) for all j such that i+ k ≤ j < i+ 2k. The
edge (gi, gj) means that the values (vi, . . . , vj) might define one of the possible
clusters. Then, the cost of the edge (gi, gj) is defined as the within-group sum
of squared error for such cluster. That is, SSE = Σjl=i(vl − v¯)2, where v¯ is the
average record of the cluster.
Given this graph, the optimal univariate microaggregation is defined by the
shortest path algorithm between the nodes g0 and gn. This shortest path can
be computed using the Dijkstra algorithm. Thus, the optimal clustering can be
computed in linear time.
Projection Based Microaggregation The basic idea of Projection Based
Microaggregation methods is to approximately reduce the multivariate microag-
gregation problem into the univariate case, by projecting natt > 1 attributes
(corresponding to some attributes of the records) into a single one.
The use of this projection techniques is motivated by the difficulty of sorting
multivariate data that arises when one tries to extend the optimal univariate
solution to the case of multivariate microaggregation.
Ideally, the employed projection should maintain the global statistical prop-
erties of the initial (non-projected) values. With this goal in mind, two projection
methods seem particularly suitable: the principal component projection [12] and
the sum of Z-scores [13].
Projected multivariate microaggregation is described in Algorithm 1, when
applied to a microdata file X with n records and nattr attributes.
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Algorithm 1: Projected Microaggregation
Data: X: original microdata, k: integer
Result: X’: protected microdata
begin
Split the microdata file X into r sub-files {Xi}1≤i≤r, each one with vi
attributes of the n records, such that
r∑
i=1
vi = V ;
foreach (Xi ∈ X) do
Apply a projection algorithm to the attributes in Xi, which results in
an univariate vector zi with n components (one for each record) ;
Sort the components of zi in increasing order;
Apply to the sorted vector zi the following variant of the univariate
optimal microaggregation method explained in Section 2.2: use the
algorithm defining the cost of the edges 〈zi,s, zi,t〉, with s < t, as the
within-group sum of square error for the vi-dimensional cluster in Xi
which contains the original attributes of the records whose projected
values are in the set {zi,s, zi,s+1, . . . , zi,t} ;
For each cluster resulting from the previous step, compute the
vi-dimensional centroid and replace all the records in the cluster by the
centroid ;
Ideally, the employed projection should maintain the global statistical prop-
erties of the initial (non-projected) values. With this goal in mind, two pro-
jection methods seem particularly suitable: the principal component projection
(PCP) [12] and the sum of Z-scores [13]. PCP is a projection technique that
preserves the variance of the multivariate data set as much as possible in the
projected data set in order to simplify the complexity of the data set, while pre-
serving the statistical utility of the projected data. On the other hand, Z-score
is a dimensionless quantity derived by subtracting the mean of each attribute
from a single value and then dividing the difference by the standard deviation
of that attribute. The resulting microaggregation algorithms obtained after the
application of these two projection methods, called PCP microaggregation and
Zscores microaggregation, will be used in Section 4 to test the quality of our new
technique. See [17] for more details.
MDAV Microaggregation The MDAV (Maximum Distance to Average Vec-
tor) algorithm [7, 14] is an heuristic algorithm for clustering records in a mi-
crodata file X so that each cluster is constrained to contain at least k records.
This algorithm can be used for univariate microaggregation and multivariate
microaggregation. The MDAV algorithm is described in Algorithm 2.
MDAV generic algorithm can be instantiated for different data types, us-
ing appropriate definitions for distance and average. Normally, the most distant
record and the closest records are computed using the Euclidean distance, and
the average record is defined as the arithmetic mean of the records. The aver-
8 Jordi Nin
Algorithm 2: MDAV
Data: X: original microdata, k: integer
Result: X’: protected microdata
begin
while (|X| > k) do
Compute the average record x¯ of all records in X;
Consider the most distant record xr to the average record x¯;
Form a cluster around xr. The cluster contains xr together with the
k − 1 closest records to xr;
Remove these records from microdata file X;
if (|X| > k) then
Find the most distant record xs from record xr;
Form a cluster around xs. The cluster contains xs together with the
k − 1 closest records to xs;
Remove these records from microdata file X;
Form a cluster with the remaining records;
age record is used to replace the original records when building the protected
microdata file.
2.3 Measures to Evaluate Risk and Utility
As we discussed before, a microdata protection method must guarantee a certain
level of privacy (low disclosure risk). At the same time, since the goal is to
allow third parties to perform reliable statistical computations over the released
(protected) data, the protection method must ensure that the protected data is
statistically close enough to the original one.
Therefore, given a microdata protection method, we have two inversely re-
lated aspects to measure: the disclosure risk (DR), which is the risk that an
intruder obtains correct links between the protected and the original data; and
the information loss (IL) caused by the protection method. When one of them
increases, the other one decreases. The two extreme cases are the following ones:
(i) if the original microdata is released, then information loss is zero, but the
disclosure risk is maximum; (ii) if the original microdata is encrypted and then
released, the disclosure risk is (almost) zero, but the information loss is maxi-
mum.
There are different generic measures proposed in the literature to evaluate
the quality of a data protection method. One approach was presented in [5, 6],
where the authors combine both information loss and disclosure risk in a score
using the arithmetic mean. This method is refined in subsequent works [19, 24].
In order to calculate the score, first we need to calculate some information
loss and disclosure risk meausures:
– Information Loss (IL): Let X and X ′ be matrices representing the orig-
inal and the protected microdata files, respectively. Let V and R be the
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covariance matrix and the correlation matrix of X, respectively; let X be
the vector of variable averages for X and let S be the diagonal of V . Define
V ′, R′, X
′
, and S′ analogously from X ′. The information loss is computed
by averaging the mean variations of X − X ′,V − V ′,S − S′, and the mean
absolute error of R−R′ and multiplying the resulting average by 100.
– Disclosure Risk (DR): For this measure in the original paper, the au-
thors assume two different scenarios in order to evaluate DR: (i) Distance
Linkage Disclosure risk (DLD), which is the average percentage of linked
records using distance based RL [21]. Note that, this scenario is the same
described in Section 2.1, where the intruder has access to an external data
source and he is interested in disclosure the identity of the individual and
(ii) Interval Disclosure risk (ID) which is the average percentage of original
values falling into the intervals around their corresponding masked values,
in this scenario the intruder has no access to an external data source and he
is interested to disclose the original value of a protected one. The two values
are computed over the number of attributes that the intruder is assumed to
know, in particular, in this paper we assume the scenario described in [19]
where the intruder knows all the possible combinations from one to all the
attributes. The Disclosure Risk is computed as DR = 0.5 ·DLD + 0.5 · ID.
– Score: The final score measure is computed by weighting the presented
measures and it was also proposed in [6]:
score = 0.5 IL+ 0.5DR
Note that the better a protection method, the lower its score.
Apart from this generic measure for protection method evaluation, we can
find specific IL and DR measures for microaggregation in the literature. For
instance, the total Sum of Square Error SSE is usually used for information loss
evaluation, since it is the fitness function used by microaggregation to minimize
the loss of statistical utility of the protected microdata file. In order to compute
the DR, in [18], a specific DR measure is defined. The idea is to consider the ratio
between the total number n of records and the number of protected records which
are different. This gives the average size of each ‘global cluster’ in the protected
microdata file. This measure was denoted as k′, this real anonymity measure is
computed as
k′ =
n
|{x′|x′ ∈ X ′}|
Since our work compares our new microaggregation algorithm with other
classical microaggregation methods, we use both the specific measures presented
above and the general score measure.
3 One Dimension Microaggregation
In this section, we present a new microaggregation method called one dimension
microaggregation (Mic1D-k, for short). This method gathers all the values of
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the microdata file into a single sorted vector, independently of the attribute
they belong to. Then, it microaggregates all the mixed values together. The
experiments presented here show that, by using real data, our proposal obtains
lower disclosure risk than previous approaches whereas the information loss is
preserved.
As shown in Figure 3, Mic1D-k is based on an important data pre-processing
technique that must be applied before starting the protection process. This pre-
processing phase is decomposed in several steps. Namely, vectorization, sorting,
partitioning and normalization. Following, we go into further details about these
steps.
Vectorization
The vectorization step gathers all the values from the microdata file in a single
vector, independently on the attribute they belong to. Thereby, we ignore the
attribute semantics and therefore the possible correlation between two different
attributes in the microdata file. In other words, we desemantize the microdata
file. Later, this process plays a central role in the discussion about the results
achieved by Mic1D-k.
Formally speaking, let D be the original microdata file to be protected. We
denote by R the number of records in D. Each record consists of natt numerical
attributes. We assume that none of the records contains missing values. We
denote by N the total number of values in D. As a consequence, N = R · natt.
Let V be a vector of size N containing all the values in the microdata file.
Mic1D-k treats values in the microdata file as if they were completely indepen-
dent. In other words, the concept of record and attribute is ignored and the N
values in the microdata file are placed in V .
The effect of this step on a certain microdata file is depicted in the upper
half of Figure 3.
Sorting
Since the values in the vectorized microdata file belong to different source at-
tributes, they present a pseudo-random aspect and it becomes very difficult to
find the optimal partitions, i.e. partitions with SSE value as low as possible.
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In order to simplify this search, the whole vector is sorted. This way, by the
conclusions extracted from the univariate microaggregation presented in Sub-
section 2.2, optimal partitions are contiguous and, therefore, the partitioning
process in this new vector can be done easily, as we will see later.
Formally, V is sorted increasingly. Let us call Vs the sorted vector of size N
containing the sorted data and vi the ith element of Vs, where 0 ≤ i < N .
Partitioning
Similarly to general microaggregation, in order to ensure a certain level of pri-
vacy (k-anonymity), Mic1D-k splits the vectorized microdata file in several k-
partitions and it calculates the average value for each partition. By modifying
the value of k, Mic1D-k allows us to adjust the trade-off between information
loss (SSE) and disclosure risk. Note that if the vectorized microdata file was not
sorted (previous step), k would not have this property.
Formally, Vs is divided into smaller sub-vectors or partitions. We define k
where 1 < k ≤ N as the number of values per partition. Note that if k is not a
divisor of N , the last partition will contain a smaller number of values. Let P
be the number of partitions containing k values. We call r the number of values
in the last partition where 0 ≤ r < k. Therefore, N = kP + r. We will suppose
that r > 0, so we have P + 1 partitions (note that r > 0 if and only if k does
not divide N). We denote by Pm the mth partition.
Let vm,n be defined as the nth element of Pm:{
vm,n := vmk+n n = 0 . . . k − 1 m = 0 . . . P − 1
vP,n := vPk+n n = 0 . . . r − 1
The upper half of Figure 3 shows the effect of this step on a certain microdata
file.
Normalization
Since the range of the values in the different attributes could differ significantly
among them, it is necessary to normalize the data to a certain predefined range
of values.
There are many ways to normalize a microdata file. A possible solution would
be to normalize each attribute independently before the application of the vec-
torization step. However, this normalization method could present problems with
skewed attributes and therefore the attributes could not be merged in the sorting
step. For this reason, we propose to normalize the data stored in each partition
separately. Thereby, similar values are assigned to the same partition and there-
fore the chances to avoid the effect of skewness in the data are higher.
Formally, we denote the normalized values as v¯m,n and the normalized par-
titions as P¯m. Let maxm and minm be the maximum and the minimum values
in the mth partition:
maxm := max
0≤i<k
{vm,i} minm := min
0≤i<k
{vm,i}
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The normalized values are then defined as:{
v¯m,n :=
vm,n−minm
maxm−minm if maxm 6= minm
v¯m,n := 0.5 if maxm = minm
where 0 ≤ m < P (or 0 ≤ m ≤ P if k does not divide N ,) and 0 ≤ n < k. Note
that maxm = minm means that all the values in the partition are the same. In
this case, the normalized value is centered in the normalization range.
Re-sorting and Re-normalization
One of the goals of the sorting process, apart from reducing the SSE value,
is to desemantize the microdata file, i.e., to merge values from different at-
tributes in order to completely break their semantics and therefore make the
re-identification process more difficult. If the range of values of a certain at-
tribute differs significantly from the others, it is likely that it is not merged in
previous steps.
Then, in order to appropriately mingle all attributes, once data has been
sorted and normalized, we repeat these two steps (sorting and normalization).
Since the range of values have been homogenized by normalization, attributes
are conveniently mixed in the second sorting step and thus the microdata file is
correctly preprocessed.
Mean Value Computation
Once data is preprocessed, for each partition P¯m, the mean value of its compo-
nents is computed:
µm =
k−1∑
n=0
v¯m,n
k
m = 0 . . . P − 1 µP =
r−1∑
n=0
v¯P,n
r
where the latter expression is applied to the last partition if r > 0, i.e., if k does
not divide the total number of values in the microdata file.
The protected value p¯m,n for v¯m,n is then:{
p¯m,n = µm n = 0 . . . k − 1 m = 0 . . . P − 1
p¯P,n = µP n = 0 . . . r − 1
Finally, Mic1D-k denormalizes the data into the original range, according to
the normalization and re-normalization steps in the previous block. Then, the
protected values are placed in the protected microdata file in the same place
occupied by the corresponding vm,n in the original microdata file. In this way,
we are undoing the sorting and vectorization steps.
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4 Experiments
We have tested Mic1D-k with real data extracted from two microdata files avail-
able in the Internet. The first one, denoted as Water-treatment, was extracted
from the UCI repository [15], and it has already been used in other works dealing
with disclosure risk evaluation, e.g. [16]. It contains 35 attributes corresponding
to 380 entries or records. The second microdata file, called Census, was extracted
using the Data Extraction System [27] of the U.S. Census Bureau, and it has
been used as a reference database in many works dealing with statistical data
protection, e.g. [4, 6, 17]. It contains 1080 records and 13 attributes.
As we will see later on, Mic1D-k achieves lower disclosure risk using real data
than other multivariate microaggregation methods, such as MDAV, whereas it
preserves a lower information loss.
4.1 Attribute Selection
To apply multivariate microaggregation to a microdata file X, we need to choose
among the different microaggregation methods, the parameter k, and the number
of blocks the microdata file X is split into. However, there are other parameters
to be considered when the number of blocks B is larger than 1. As it was ex-
plained in [18], the way in which the attributes are grouped into blocks affects
significantly the results and the quality of multivariate microaggregation.
It is a standard practice in statistical agencies to select the attributes on
the basis of statistical utility. It is clear that, if the considered attributes are
highly correlated, two records which are similar with respect to one attribute,
will be also similar with respect to another one. Due to this, if microaggregation
is applied to correlated attributes, when two values of the same attribute coming
from different records are close, each pair of attributes coming from the remaining
attributes in the cluster will be also close. Then, the intra-cluster distance is short
and the information loss is low.
Nevertheless, as usual, statistical utility and privacy are inversely related.
Therefore, the disclosure risk of microaggregation in this case is higher than
in the case where correlated attributes are put into different blocks. Then as
pointed out in [18], it is possible to group the attributes in a different way:
blocks are formed in such a way that the first attributes of all blocks are (highly)
correlated, the second attributes of all blocks are also (highly) correlated, and
so on. This way, we are making blocks correlated, instead of constructing blocks
with correlated attributes. The goal of this approach is to increase the resulting
real anonymity k′. If two records A and B are in the same cluster for some
blocks, this means that the first attribute values of these records are more or
less close to each other, and the same for the second attribute of the block, etc.
Then, when we consider another block, if the j-th attribute of this new block is
(highly) correlated with the j-th attribute of the latter block, records A and B
will probably be close to each other as well, with respect to the attributes in the
second block. Therefore, with some non-negligible probability, A and B will fall
in the same cluster, again. Ideally, some records will fall inside the same clusters,
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for each block of attributes, and so the number of protected records which will
be exactly equal will be higher, increasing in this way the real anonymity and
the privacy level of the released data.
4.2 Algorithms Parameterization
We have tested Mic1D-k and compared our results with those obtained by the
projected microaggregation (PCP and Zscores) and MDAV microaggregation,
using the Census and Water Treatment microdata files. As we explained above,
when protecting a microdata file using multivariate microaggregation, the way
in which the data is split to form blocks is highly relevant with regard to the
degree of privacy achieved (k′ value). For this reason, we have reduced both
microdata files to have 9 attributes, which we detail in Tables 1 and 2.
id Name Description
a1 PH-E Input pH to plant
a2 PH-P Input pH to primary settler
a3 PH-D Input pH to secondary settler
a4 DQO-E Input chemical demand of oxygen to plant
a5 COND-P Input conductivity to primary settler
a6 COND-D Input conductivity to secondary settler
a7 DBO-S Output biological demand of oxygen
a8 SS-S Output suspended solids
a9 SED-S Output sediments
Table 1. Attribute description of the Water-treatment microdata file.
id Name Description
a1 AGI Adjusted gross income
a2 FICA Social security retirement payroll deduction
a3 INTVAL Amount of interest income
a4 EMCONTRB Employer contribution for health insurance
a5 TAXINC Taxable income amount
a6 WSALVAL Amount: Total wage and salary
a7 ERNVAL Business or farm net earnings in 19
a8 PEARNVAL Total person earnings
a9 POTHVAL Total other persons income
Table 2. Attribute description of the Census microdata file
In both files, attributes a1, a2 and a3 are highly correlated as well as at-
tributes a4, a5 and a6 and attributes a7, a8 and a9. On the contrary, attributes
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in different blocks (e.g. a1 and a4) are non-correlated. For our experiments, when
protecting data, we assume attributes to be split into three blocks of three at-
tributes each. Also, we consider two situations when protecting the microdata
files: blocking correlated attributes and, therefore, having non-correlated blocks
(low information loss and low disclosure risk), i.e., (a1, a2, a3), (a4, a5, a6) and
(a7, a8, a9); and blocking non-correlated attributes but correlated blocks, i.e.,
(a1, a4, a7), (a2, a5, a8) and (a3, a6, a9).
For each microdata file and attribute selection method, we apply all microag-
gregation methods using different configurations (i.e. different values of k). The
selection of these values aims at covering a wide range of SSE values and, thus,
studying scenarios with different information loss values. Namely, we protect
the microdata files with parameter k = 5, 25, 50 for the Census microdata file,
and k = 5, 15, 25 for the Water-treatment microdata file.
C
o
rr
el
a
te
d 1G (a1, a2, a3), (a4, a5, a6), (a7, a8, a9)
2G
(a1, a2, a5), (a1, a3, a7), (a2, a3, a6), (a1, a4, a5), (a2, a4, a6)
(a5, a6, a9), (a6, a7, a8), (a1, a8, a9), (a2, a7, a9)
3G
(a1, a4, a7), (a1, a5, a8), (a1, a6, a9), (a2, a4, a7), (a2, a5, a8)
(a2, a6, a9), (a3, a4, a7), (a3, a5, a8), (a3, a6, a9)
N
o
n
-c
o
rr
el
a
te
d
1G (a1, a4, a7), (a2, a5, a8), (a3, a6, a9)
2G
(a1, a4, a5), (a1, a3, a7), (a4, a7, a8), (a1, a2, a5), (a2, a4, a8)
(a5, a8, a9), (a3, a6, a8), (a1, a6, a9), (a3, a4, a9)
3G
(a1, a2, a3), (a1, a5, a6), (a1, a8, a9), (a2, a3, a4), (a4, a5, a6)
(a4, a8, a9), (a2, a3, a7), (a5, a6, a7), (a7, a8, a9)
Table 3. Different groups of attributes known by the intruder.
For Mic1D-k, we use k = 3000, 4000, 5000 for the Census microdata file
and k = 500, 800, 900 for the Water Treatment microdata file. Note that, since
Mic1D-k desemantizes the microdata file, it does not make sense to consider
different situations related to the correlation of the attributes and, therefore,
we protect the data just once for each parametrization. In order to make a fair
comparison, we have chosen the values of k in Mic1D-k to obtain similar SSE
values to those obtained by MDAV after protecting the microdata files.
4.3 Algorithms Comparison
In order to compare the disclosure risk of microaggregation methods, we consider
that a possible intruder knows the values of three random attributes of the
original microdata file. Different tests are performed assuming that the intruder
knows different sets of three attributes. Depending on these attributes, by using
multivariate microaggregation, the intruder will have information coming from
one or more groups. Table 3 shows all the considered possibilities.
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k SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k 5 64.99 5.00 1.92 1.00
25 223.73 25.12 7.00 1.09
50 328.31 51.43 14.66 1.41
P
C
P
-k 5 131.05 5.06 1.91 1.00
25 320.76 25.12 6.72 1.02
50 441.66 51.43 13.97 1.15
Z
sc
o
re
s-
k 5 66.62 5.05 1.91 1.00
25 159.95 25.12 6.80 1.04
50 243.81 51.43 14.23 1.30
M
ic
1
D
-k 3000 32.27 8.37 9.87 5.77
4000 129.06 20.10 22.09 13.89
5000 738.12 72.83 76.08 55.02
Correlated attributes
k SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k 5 58.49 5.00 1.96 1.02
25 260.13 25.12 7.35 1.24
50 356.47 51.43 15.86 2.05
P
C
P
-k 5 124.99 5.03 1.91 1.00
25 251.53 25.12 6.74 1.03
50 382.69 51.43 14.00 1.22
Z
sc
o
re
s-
k 5 121.68 5.04 1.93 1.00
25 242.26 25.12 6.97 1.07
50 354.83 51.43 14.86 1.45
M
ic
1
D
-k 3000 32.27 5.63 8.51 8.04
4000 129.06 13.53 19.45 19.19
5000 738.12 59.77 67.77 67.25
Non-correlated attributes
Table 4. SSE and real k′ of different microaggregation methods and parameteriza-
tions using the Census microdata file. Method-k corresponds to microaggregation using
method Method (MDAV, PCP or Zscores) with initial anonymity value k.
k SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k 5 28.18 5.09 1.94 1.00
15 72.03 15.20 4.42 1.01
25 114.56 25.33 7.28 1.10
P
C
P
-k 5 28.59 5.14 1.94 1.01
15 71.99 15.20 4.41 1.02
25 110.91 25.33 7.24 1.04
Z
sc
o
re
s-
k 5 23.78 5.14 1.94 1.01
15 72.23 15.20 4.43 1.03
25 111.69 25.33 7.23 1.07
M
ic
1
D
-k 500 65.89 3.25 3.39 1.76
800 80.95 7.87 7.55 4.67
900 255.64 12.95 13.61 9.14
Correlated attributes
k SSE k′
1G 2G 3G
M
D
A
V
-k 5 69.51 5.00 2.03 1.03
15 173.96 15.20 5.28 1.39
25 259.07 25.33 9.22 1.91
P
C
P
-k 5 93.67 5.02 1.94 1.01
15 170.12 15.20 4.47 1.03
25 229.50 25.33 7.33 1.13
Z
sc
o
re
s-
k 5 73.52 5.02 1.97 1.02
15 160.30 15.20 4.75 1.10
25 231.81 25.33 8.21 1.46
M
ic
1
D
-k 500 65.89 2.78 2.58 2.63
800 80.95 4.74 7.17 6.88
900 255.64 9.07 14.52 11.71
Non-correlated attributes
Table 5. SSE and real k′ of different microaggregation methods and parameterizations
using the Water Treatment microdata file.Method-k corresponds to microaggregation
using method Method (MDAV, PCP or Zscores) with initial anonymity value k.
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Firstly, we suppose that the three known attributes belong to the same mi-
croaggregated block (e.g. (a1, a2, a3) in the correlated scenario or (a1, a4, a7)
in the non-correlated). Since the size of the three microagreggation blocks is
3, there are only three options to consider. We denote this case by 1G. Since
the intruder has only access to data from one group, multivariate microaggre-
gation ensures the k-anonymity property (this is the best possible scenario for
multivariate microaggregation). However, note that, usually, the intruder cannot
choose the attributes obtained from external sources and it might be difficult to
obtain all the attributes for the same group. Secondly, we assume that the known
attributes belong to two different microaggregated groups. There are many pos-
sible combinations of three attributes under this assumption, so nine of them
were chosen randomly. We refer to this case as 2G. Finally, case 3G is defined
analogously to 2G, and also nine possibilities of known attributes are considered.
Note that, in both scenarios 2G and 3G, k-anonymity is not ensured by mul-
tivariate microaggregation. Note also that, if the intruder had more than three
attributes, it would not be possible to consider 1G. We are considering the case
were the intruder only has three attributes to study a scenario were multivariate
microaggregation can still preserve k-anonymity.
The second column of Tables 4 and 5 presents the SSE values for all the
parameterizations and situations described before. Note that the range of SSE
covered by all the methods is similar. This allows us to compare the disclosure
risk of all the algorithms fairly. For all these scenarios, we compute k′ and the
mean of all the k′ values in each situation is presented in the third, fourth
and fifth columns. Note that, whereas multivariate microaggregation is affected
by the fact that the chosen attributes are correlated or not, this effect is not
noticeable using Mic1D-k. Specifically, when the attributes in a group are not
correlated, the information loss (SSE) using multivariate microaggregation tends
to be increased since we are trying to collapse the records in a single value, using
three independent attributes or dimensions. For instance, as it is illustrated
in the first row of Table 5 (MDAV microaggregation with k equal to 5), the
SSE value increases from 28.18 to 69.51 when the blocks are made using non
correlated attributes . Nevertheless, this effect can be neglected with Mic1D-k
since, thanks to the data preprocessing, the whole microaggregation process is
performed on a single dimension (vector of values), the semantics of attributes
are ignored and the effect caused by attribute correlations is avoided. For this
reason, in Tables 4 and 5 SSE values are identical for the correlated and non
correlated attribute blocking.
The results described in Tables 4 and 5 also show that, Mic1D-k achieves
lower disclosure risk levels (larger values of k′) than those achieved by multivari-
ate microaggregation for similar information loss (SSE), especially when the at-
tributes chosen come from different microaggregated groups (2G and 3G), which
is the most common case. For instance, if we observe the k′ values of MDAV mi-
croaggregation using the most ’private’ configuration (k equal to 25 and using
non correlated attributes) we can see that the resulting k′ values where the in-
truder has access to attributes coming from more than one group (G2 equal to
18 Jordi Nin
9.22 and G3 equal to 1.91) are lower than using Mic1D-k with similar SSE value
(G2 equal to 14.52 and G3 equal to 11.71). Note also that, when the intruder
has access to the three attributes coming from a single microaggregated group,
multivariate microaggregation configurations present k′ values which are similar
or, in some cases, even larger than those obtained by Mic1D-k (comparing cases
with similar SSE). This is normal since such methods preserve the k-anonymity
in this case. However, in the remaining scenarios (2G and 3G), that represent
most of the cases, Mic1D-k achieves larger k′ values than those obtained by
multivariate microaggregation when similar SSE values are compared.
4.4 Method comparison using generic measures
We have repeated the experiments presented in [6] where a large variety of pro-
tection methods were compared using the Census microdata file based on the
score, presented in Subsection 2.3, to measure the results. We have computed
the disclosure risk considering different scenarios ranging from the extreme case
where the intruder knows only one attribute, to the opposite case where it knows
all the attributes, as in [19]. Specifically, we have considered 512 different sets
of attributes for each Mic1D-k and multivariate microaggregation parameteriza-
tion. The total number of executions run in these experiments is 10752.
k IL DLD ID Score
M
D
A
V
-k 5 31.67 34.11 69.70 41.79
25 51.14 11.70 54.65 42.16
50 60.19 5.68 47.75 43.45
P
C
P
-k 5 63.18 4.35 47.63 44.59
25 57.31 2.23 38.53 38.85
50 57.86 1.81 34.41 37.98
Z
sc
o
re
s-
k 5 59.64 12.13 57.71 47.28
25 79.90 6.96 52.86 54.90
50 89.33 6.25 50.09 58.75
M
ic
1
D
-k 3000 22.17 35.95 54.16 33.61
4000 57.31 16.91 48.53 45.02
5000 82.44 4.94 32.22 50.51
Correlated attributes
k IL DLD ID Score
M
D
A
V
-k 5 41.47 23.14 63.03 42.28
25 51.47 6.56 49.07 39.64
50 44.11 3.26 43.87 33.84
P
C
P
-k 5 55.70 3.75 42.71 39.47
25 78.39 2.02 34.81 48.40
50 83.30 1.50 32.29 50.10
Z
sc
o
re
s-
k 5 51.76 4.80 51.66 40.00
25 86.58 2.37 47.19 55.68
50 90.81 2.43 43.80 56.96
M
ic
1
D
-k 3000 22.17 35.95 54.16 33.61
4000 57.31 16.91 48.53 45.02
5000 82.44 4.94 32.22 50.51
Non-correlated attributes
Table 6. Score k′ of different microaggregation methods and parameterizations using
the Census microdata file. Method-k corresponds to microaggregation using method
Method (MDAV, PCP or Zscores) with initial anonymity value k.
The first main conclusion extracted from the results presented in Table 6
is that the quality obtained by Mic1D-k is orthogonal to the degree of correla-
tion between the attributes in a cluster. On the contrary, this correlation has a
significant effect on the remaining techniques. For example, the best score for
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MDAV using correlated attributes is 41.79 while it is 33.84 using non-correlated
attributes. In this experiments we test two extreme cases where all the attributes
are correlated or none of them. In a real scenario, we would not be able to choose
the attributes to be protected, and, as a consequence, we do not have any control
on the correlation between them making the application of these multivariate
microaggregation techniques less suitable than our proposal.
Also, the configuration process is simplified for Mic1D-k. While the other
multivariate microaggregation methods must choose the best attribute blocking
selection for clustering, which may be as difficult as the anonymization problem
itself, we avoid this problem by replacing the attribute selection phase by a
significantly less complex pre-processing phase.
Finally, Mic1D-k obtains the lowest score when k is equal to 3000 (33.61).
MDAV algorithm also obtains low scores when non-correlated attributes are
grouped together (k equal to 50, 33.84). However, as we have said before, using
MDAV one has to decide which attributes are to be grouped together and this
is not a straightforward decision.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented a new type of microaggregation called One Di-
mension microaggregation. This microaggregation method significantly diminish
the problem of attribute selection in multivariate microaggregation achieving in
general a higher level of privacy than that obtained by three of the most well-
known microaggregation algorithms. This is specially true as, from the attributes
known by the intruder, the number of these coming from different microaggre-
gation groups of multivariate microaggregation increases.
As future work, we plan to develop and implement a method for vector
partitioning which considers the SSE value when the partitions are done so that
we can reduce the SSE value of our method and, therefore, the information loss.
All in all, in this paper we show that microaggregation is a very useful
method for the anonymization of complex records containing a large number
of attributes, when it is combined with the data preprocessing proposed in our
work.
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